










The Optimal Climate Policy Portfolio  








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2988 
CATEGORY 10: ENERGY AND CLIMATE ECONOMICS 
MARCH 2010 
 





An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




The Optimal Climate Policy Portfolio  





This paper studies the implications for climate policy of the interactions between 
environmental and knowledge externalities. Using a numerical analysis performed with the 
hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH, extended to include mutual spillovers between 
the energy and the non-energy sector, we show that the combination between environmental 
and knowledge externalities provides a strong rationale for implementing a portfolio of 
policies for both emissions reduction and the internalisation of knowledge externalities. 
Moreover, we show that implementing technology policy as a substitute for stabilisation 
policy is likely to increase global emissions. 
JEL-Code: C72, H23, Q25, Q28, O31, O41, Q54. 
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1. Introduction 
There  is  now  a  wide  agreement  that  any  stringent  policy  to  reduce  the  concentration  of 
atmospheric concentrations of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) will call for a tremendous effort in 
technological innovation. Therefore, at the frontier of climate and energy modelling research we 
find  the  study  of  innovation  dynamics.  During  the  last  decade  the  description  of  technical 
change in integrated models for climate policy analysis has greatly improved.
1 However, current 
approaches still omit important elements that affect the dynamics of technical change and a 
broader  framework  for  analysing  technical  change  is  advocated.  In  particular,  knowledge 
externalities, although pervasive and extremely relevant in shaping innovation dynamics, are 
usually not modelled. 
The presence of market failures in the R&D sector, as emphasized by Griliches (1957, 1992), is 
confirmed by the evidence, virtually found in all studies, that the social rate of return on R&D 
expenditure is higher than the corresponding private rate
2: estimates of the marginal social rate 
of return to R&D investment range between 30 and 50 percent and of private return between 7 
and 15 percent. 
Spillovers are generally acknowledged as a fundamental aspect of technical change. The new 
growth  theory  that  has  followed  the  seminal  work  of  Romer  (1990),  has  emphasised  the 
importance of international R&D knowledge spillovers (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, chs.11 
and 12), and of both intrasectoral and intersectoral R&D knowledge spillovers in explaining 
countries’  productivity  (Jones,  1999;  Li,  2000).  Those  contributions  have  stimulated  the 
development of a number of studies that estimate the importance of R&D spillovers among 
firms, sectors or countries.
3 Overall, the available empirical evidence supports the idea that 
spillover effects are relevant and positive, even if, due to the variety of methodologies used, 
estimates span over a wide range and their significance varies across studies.  
When it comes to technologies for carbon emissions reduction, the difference between private 
and social rate of return to R&D investment arises from a double externality: the presence of 
both environmental and knowledge externalities. First, without a price on carbon that equates 
the global and the private cost of emitting GHGs, all low emissions technologies are relatively 
                                                 
1 See Gillingham et al. (2008) for a recent overview of modelling methodology. 
2 Among others Mansfield (1977, 1996), Jaffe (1986), Hall (1996), and Jones and Williams (1998). 
3 An extensive review of the literature on spillovers at firm level can be found in Wieser (2005). Keller 
(2004) reviews a large part of the literature on international spillovers.   2 
disadvantaged and the level of investment is therefore sub-optimal. Second, the private return to 
investment  in  R&D  is  lower  than  the  social  return  of  investment  due  to  the  incomplete 
appropriability of knowledge creation, thus pushing further away investments from the socially 
optimal level.
4 
Many researchers that have worked on the optimal design of climate policy have stressed the 
importance  of  studying  climate  policy  in  a  second-best  setting  considering  the  double 
externality. For example, Jaffe et al. (2005) proposes to use a portfolio made of a price signal to 
correct  for  the  environmental  externality  coupled  with  a  policy  to  support  investment  in 
technologies to reduce GHG emissions. The idea of complementing a stabilisation policy with 
an R&D policy in order to address both externalities at once is instead opposed by Nordhaus 
(2009). He argues that once the environmental externality is corrected, there are no evident 
reasons to treat research in technologies to reduce GHG emissions differently from other kinds 
of research that share the same characteristic of public good. 
These  doubts  recently  raised  by  Nordhaus  (2009)  clearly  show  that  we  are  far  from 
understanding the optimal policy mix that reduces effectively and efficiently global warming 
and climate change. This paper contributes to the literature by providing answers to three sets of 
major policy questions using a sophisticated modelling environment in which it is possible to 
study both the environmental and the knowledge externality. 
These three sets of policy questions are the following. First, what is the optimal response, in 
terms of investments in R&D (both in energy and non-energy technologies) of a policy to 
stabilise  the  atmospheric  concentrations  of  GHGs,  when  domestic  intersectoral  knowledge 
spillovers are explicitly modelled? Can we expect that the stabilisation policy will drive the 
economies closer to or farther from the socially optimal level of innovation? Second, what 
would  be  the  optimal  amount  of  R&D  spending  and  what  would  be  the  environmental 
consequences  of  correcting  only  knowledge  externalities?  Third,  what  are  the  welfare 
implications of addressing both environmental and knowledge externalities with a policy mix 
that  combines  a  stabilisation  policy  and  R&D  policies  to  support  the  optimal  level  of 
innovation? 
To provide an answer to these questions we have up-graded the hybrid Integrated Assessment 
Model  WITCH  model  by  introducing  knowledge  spillovers  between  R&D  investments  to 
increase energy efficiency (energy sector) and investments in knowledge creation to increase the 
                                                 
4 For an introduction to the literature on the double externality see Nordhaus (1990).   3 
productivity of the capital-labour aggregate (non-energy sector). We build upon previous work 
in which knowledge dynamics of the WITCH model have been enriched by introducing directed 
technical change in energy and non-energy inputs (Carraro, Massetti and Nicita, 2009) and we 
abstract from international spillovers, which, as we show in a previous paper (Bosetti et al, 
2008), have a modest role in shaping innovation dynamics. 
Our  work  represents  a  pioneer  attempt  to  introduce  intersectoral  spillovers  in  a  complex 
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM). IAMs typically do not explicitly describe market failures. 
Until now, the few attempts to incorporate R&D spillovers in integrated models for the study of 
climate policy have been confined to the inclusion of intrasectoral spillovers (Popp, 2006), and 
international spillovers (e.g. Bosetti et al, 2008). However, empirical studies provide evidence 
that intersectoral spillovers are extremely significant, as claimed by Wieser (2005) in his broad 
review of the literature. Without intersectoral spillovers, models unrealistically assume that the 
advance of technological frontiers of different sectors is mutually independent, omitting the 
interactions among the different drivers of technical change. 
By describing endogenous knowledge development dynamics in a second-best world, we are 
able to produce insights on the widely debated question of the optimal portfolio of climate 
policies. Moreover, our numerical assessments give quantitative foundations to a debate that has 
been theoretical and not grounded on empirical basis so far. 
Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006) are the two main studies that analyse by means 
of computational models with knowledge externalities a climate policy portfolio in which R&D 
policy is coupled with a policy to reduce GHG emissions. However, there are major differences 
among  modelling  assumptions  that  allow  only  marginal  comparisons  of  results.  First  and 
foremost  Goulder  and  Schneider  (1997)  and  Popp  (2006)  concentrate  only  on  intrasectoral 
spillovers. The WITCH model displays intrasectoral spillovers and in principle it is possible to 
replicate  the  analysis  of  the  earlier  studies.  We  assume,  however,  that  the  intrasectoral 
inefficiencies  in  knowledge  creation  are  fully  internalised  and  we  instead  concentrate  on 
intersectoral spillovers to incorporate the complex interaction of R&D dynamics between two 
broad sectors that are affected differently by a policy to reduce GHG emissions. A further 
difference with respect to Popp (2006) is that we do not exogenously impose that increased 
spending  in  energy  R&D  crowds-out  other  kinds  of  R&D  investments.  By  modelling 
endogenous knowledge accumulation in the two knowledge stocks, we can describe the optimal 
reallocation of resources to R&D in general, and between sectors. Our conclusions depart in a 
number of ways from those of previous studies, as we explain in the following.   4 
Our analysis is both oriented to answer policy questions and to discuss modelling issues. We 
aim to provide useful insights both to policy analysts and to the community of modellers. 
Section  2  briefly  describes  the  model  and  Section  3  presents  calibration  details.  Section  4 
describes the basic features of the Business as Usual scenario (BaU) and introduces historical 
evidence on R&D patterns. Section 5 examines how incentives to invest in different kinds of 
R&D are changed by a policy whose aim is to correct the global environmental externality that 
arises from GHGs emissions. Section 6 explores the problem from the opposite angle and we 
look at the implications for the environment of solving the sole knowledge externality. Section 7 
studies the welfare implications of addressing both externalities. Finally, Section 8 introduces 
the  results  of  the  sensitivity  analysis.  We  conclude  by  assessing  our  results  against  earlier 
findings in the literature, drawing policy implications and suggesting some patterns for further 
research. 
2. Model Description 
2.1 Short model description 
WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) is a regional integrated assessment model 
structured to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to 
climate damages (Bosetti et al. 2006, 2009b; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007). 
It is a hybrid model because it combines features of both top-down and bottom-up modelling: 
the  top-down  component  consists  of  an  inter-temporal  optimal  growth  model  in  which  the 
energy input of the aggregate production function has been integrated into a bottom-up like 
description of the energy sector. WITCH’s top-down framework guarantees a coherent, fully 
intertemporal allocation of investments, including those in the energy sector. 
World countries are aggregated in twelve regions on the basis of geographic, economic and 
technological vicinity (see Footnote 18 for a list of regions) which interact strategically on 
global  externalities:  greenhouse  gases,  technological  spillovers,  and  a  common  pool  of 
exhaustible natural resources. 
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to 
produce  a  reasonable  characterisation  of  future  energy  and  technological  scenarios  and  an 
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabilising greenhouse gases concentrations. 
In addition, by endogenously modelling fuel prices (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium), as well as   5 
the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to evaluate the implication of 
mitigation policies on the energy system in all its components. 
In  WITCH,  emissions  arise  from  fossil  fuels  used  in  the  energy  sector  and  from  land  use 
changes that release carbon sequestered in biomasses and soils. Emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF 
(short-lived fluorinated gases), LLF (long-lived fluorinated) and SO2 aerosols, which have a 
cooling effect on temperature, are also identified. Since most of these gases are determined by 
agricultural practices, the modelling relies on estimates for reference emissions, and a top-down 
approach for mitigation supply curves.
5 
A climate module governs the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere and the temperature 
response to growing GHGs concentrations. WITCH is also equipped with a damage function 
that provides the feedback on the economy of global warming. However, in this study we do not 
take a cost-benefit approach. We work in a “cost-minimisation” framework: with a given target 
in terms of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere, we produce scenarios that minimise the 
cost of achieving this target. 
Endogenous technological dynamics are a key feature of WITCH. Dedicated R&D investments 
increase the knowledge stock that governs energy efficiency. Learning-by-doing curves are used 
to model cost dynamics for wind and solar capital costs. Both energy-efficiency R&D and 
learning  exhibit  international  spillovers.  There  are  two  backstop  technologies:  one  in  the 
electricity  sector  and  the  other  in  the  non-electricity  sector.  They  necessitate  dedicated 
innovation investments to become competitive. In line with the most recent literature, the costs 
of these backstop technologies are modelled through a so-called two-factor learning curve, in 
which their price declines with investments in both dedicated R&D and  technology diffusion. 
2.2 Directed Technical Change with Intersectoral Spillovers 
Gross  output,  ( ) t n GY , ,
6  in  region  n  at  time  t  is  produced  by  combining  energy  services, 
( ) t n ES , , and capital-labour services  ( ) t n KLS ,  in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
                                                 
5 Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is estimated to offer sizeable low-cost 
abatement  potential.  WITCH  includes  a  baseline  projection  of  land  use  CO2  emissions,  as  well  as 
estimates of the global potential and costs for reducing emissions from deforestation, assuming that all 
tropical forest nations can join an emission trading system and have the capacity to implement REDD 
programs. However, avoided deforestation is not a source of emissions reductions in the version of the 
model that we used for this study. 
6 Net output,  ( ) t n Y , , is obtained after accounting for the effects of climate change on production and the 
expenditure for fuels and carbon capture and sequestration, as shown in the Appendix.   6 
nest:
7 
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Energy  services  and  capital-labour  services  are  obtained  by  aggregating  capital-labour  and 
energy  inputs  with  knowledge,  which  raises  the  productivity  of  raw  inputs.  As  a  proxy  of 
knowledge  we  use  the  cumulated  stocks  of  R&D  in  the  non-energy  and  energy  sectors, 
( ) t n HKL ,  and  ( ) t n HE , , respectively. The aggregation between raw inputs and knowledge is 
assumed to follow a standard CES function: 
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Calibration details are discussed in Section 3. The energy input  ( ) t n EN , , is produced in the 
energy sector of the economy, and we refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) for a more 
detailed  description.  It  basically  consists  of  a  series  of  nested  CES  functions  that  describe 
energy supply and demand at different levels of aggregation. Capital and labour are aggregated 
in a CES nest to produce the capital-labour raw input KL as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
KL KL KL t n L n t n K n t n KL KL C KL
r r r a a
/ 1
) , ( 1 ) , ( , - + =    (4) 
This formulation is supported by empirical evidence, as explained in Carraro, Massetti and 
Nicita (2009).
8  
2.3 The R&D Sectors 
The stocks of knowledge that each region can use to increase the productivity of capital-labour 
and energy inputs is accrued by means of investments in R&D which are in turn enhanced by 
knowledge  spillovers.  We  account  for  two  different  types  of  knowledge  spillovers.  First, 
knowledge is produced by standing on the shoulders of one nation's giants: investment in R&D 
is combined with the stock of ideas already discovered and produces new knowledge which will 
be the base for new discoveries in the following years (Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995; Popp, 2004). 
These can be seen as intertemporal spillovers or, from another perspective, as intrasectoral, 
lagged spillovers. Second, with this study we introduce intersectoral knowledge spillovers by 
                                                 
7 Where ( ) s s r / 1 - =  and s is the elasticity of substitution. 
8 See, among others: van der Werf (2007) and Chang (1994).   7 
including  among  the  inputs  of  the  idea  generating  process  in  one  sector  of  knowledge 
accumulated  in  the  other  sector.  Accordingly,  the  production  of  new  ideas,  ( ) t n Z , ,  in  the 
energy and non-energy sectors is modelled as follows: 
( )
d c b
HE HE t n HKL t n HE t n I  a   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , = ,  (5) 
( )
i h g
HKL HKL t n HE t n HKL t n I  f   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , = .  (6) 
Where  1 < + + d c b  and  1 < + + i h g . We assume that obsolescence makes a fraction d  of 
past ideas not fruitful for the purpose of current innovation activity. As a consequence, the 
stocks of knowledge evolve according to the following law of motion: 
( ) t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n HE , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + - = + d   (7) 
( ) t n Z t n  HKL )  t HKL(n HKL , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + - = + d   (8) 
The decision variables of the model are the investments in physical capital (for all different 
technologies in the energy sector and for the domestic capital stock), the two types of R&D 
investments and fuels expenditures for non-electric energy. As a consequence, the decision to 
invest in energy R&D and non-energy R&D, and therefore total R&D, is endogenous. It is 
optimally derived in each region by solving a dynamic open-loop game, which leads to a Nash 
equilibrium. 
We can either solve the model assuming that knowledge spillovers are an externality, which the 
social planner that governs the economy is not able to control, or we can assume that society 
fully internalises knowledge externalities and chooses the optimal path of R&D investments 
accordingly. Our baseline scenario is constructed with the hypothesis that intertemporal (or 
intrasectoral)  spillovers  are  fully  internalised  while  knowledge  spills  across  sectors  as  an 
externality. With this set-up we reproduce the sub-optimal investment in knowledge due to 
intersectoral spillovers. We increase  the realism of the model and introduce the possibility to 
study climate policy in a second-best setting at regional level. This is not frequent in IAMs.   8 
3. Calibration 
We depart from the standard version of the model
9 and we adopt the same nesting structure of 
the production function as in Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009), which introduce directed 
technical change in WITCH. The elasticity between energy and capital-labour services,  Y s , is 
set equal to 0.5 . The elasticity of substitution between labour and capital,  KL s , is equal to 0.8 
for all regions with the exceptions of China and South Asia, for which we allow a greater 
elasticity of substitution ( KL s  equal to 0.85). The elasticity of substitution between energy and 
energy knowledge,  ES s , is set equal to 1.67, and the same value is used for the elasticity 
between  capital-labour  and  non-energy  knowledge,  KLS s .  For  a  detailed  description  of 
empirical evidence supporting the chosen structure and parameters values we refer to Carraro, 
Massetti and Nicita (2009). 
The innovation possibility frontier has been calibrated for both the energy and the non-energy 
sector  using  data  from  the  empirical  literature  and  adjusting  the  productivity  parameter  to 
reproduce the R&D over GDP ratio at the base year (2005) and the dynamics observed in the 
past.
10 The initial stock of non-energy knowledge is built using the perpetual inventory model. 
The value of the elasticity of new knowledge creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers is 
set equal to 0.13. The choice of this value is based on the empirical work of Malerba, Mancuso 
and Montobbio (2007), which estimate a spillover-augmented knowledge production function 
analogous  to the  one  we use in  our  work. They  find  that, at  macro  level,  the  elasticity  of 
knowledge creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers is comprised between 0.11 and 0.20. 
4. The Business as Usual Scenario 
Our Business as Usual scenario (BaU) is obtained as an open-loop Nash equilibrium in which 
regions compete on the use of the environmental public good, on the use of fuels.  A lagged, 
global, learning-by-doing process governs the cost of wind and solar power plants.
11 
                                                 
9 We use here the latest version of the model, WITCH08 as described in Bosetti et al (2009). In the latest 
version, the model was updated withrecent data and revised estimates for future projection of population, 
economic activity, energy consumptions and climate variables. The base calibration year has been set at 
2005. 
10 For an alternative approach see Bosetti et al (2008). 
11 In Bosetti et al (2008) and in other  versions of the  model there are also  international knowledge 
spillovers in the Energy R&D sector. In this study we do not include international knowledge spillovers   9 
Table 1 summarises baseline trends of major variables and indicators of interest. Gross World 
Product (GWP) increases over the entire century, starting from 44 trillion in 2005. It reaches 
365 trillions in 2100, an almost nine-fold expansion. Population is exogenous, it grows at a 
declining rate and reaches a plateau at the end of the century. Gains in energy efficiency explain 
the reduction of emissions per unit of output. However, the strong expansion of output, coupled 
with  a  slight  increase  in  carbon  intensity,  offsets  all  efficiency  gains  and  overall  carbon 
emissions increase throughout the century. This leads to a more than two-fold expansion of 
GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere. 
2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2100
GWP (Trillions, 2005 USD) 44.21 87.94 151.81 228.00 306.46 359.30
World Population (billions) 6.51 8.01 9.02 9.53 9.51 8.96
Energy Intensity of Output (EJ/USD) 9.69 7.09 5.25 4.09 3.37 3.00
Carbon Intensity of Primary Energy (GtonC/EJ) 0.0183 0.0190 0.0201 0.0212 0.0221 0.0221
Concentrations of GHG (ppmv) 427 506 624 756 888 980
Investment in final good capital(%GWP) 20.23 18.49 16.82 15.57 14.51 13.98
R&D expenditure (%GWP) 2.15 2.24 2.30 2.38 2.45 2.46
Non-energy R&D (%GWP) 2.13 2.22 2.28 2.36 2.43 2.44
Energy Efficiency R&D (%GWP) 0.0216 0.0189 0.0181 0.0240 0.0178 0.0174
Energy R&D (%Total Investment in R&D) 1.01 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.71
 
Table 1. Baseline trend of major variables. 
The model features an increasing path of R&D expenditure, as share of GWP. The fraction of 
investment devoted to knowledge creation is increasing. The model features a slightly declining 
path of energy R&D as share of GWP, an increasing path of non-energy R&D as share of GWP, 
and a declining rate of energy to non-energy R&D investments, with a relative share of energy 
R&D over total R&D declining from 0.73% to 0.61%. This is mainly explained by the fact that 
fossil fuels tend to remain inexpensive in our baseline scenario and do not motivate energy 
efficiency expenditures. 
The optimal R&D investment path is in line with the historical trends of aggregate R&D. Figure 
1 shows both the historical levels and the optimal trend of total R&D over GWP at world level. 
                                                                                                                                               
but we still have international technological spillovers by means of a world learning curve for wind and 
solar power plants.   10 
Historic data feature a slightly increasing trend over the past 10 years, starting from 2% in 1996 
and reaching 2.1% in 2005. The same trend is predicted in the baseline scenario, with total R&D 













Figure 1. R&D as percentage of GWP. 
5. Addressing the environmental externality: The 
Stabilisation Scenario 
In this Section we explore how a policy to address the environmental externality only affects the 
rate and direction of technical progress when intersectoral spillovers between energy and non-
energy R&D are modelled. 
We correct the environmental externality by means of a policy to stabilise the level of GHGs 
concentration in the atmosphere. We construct a stabilisation scenario by imposing a cap on 
carbon emissions and by letting regions exchange carbon allowances on a global carbon market, 
which  equates  marginal  abatement  costs  globally.  We  choose  here  a  “Contraction  and 
Convergence” allocation of carbon allowances.
12 The path of emissions that we impose leads to 
a stabilisation of CO2 concentrations at 550ppm CO2-eq target all GHGs included. 
                                                 
12 With the “Contraction and Convergence” rule, permits are first distributed in proportion to present 
emissions  and  then  the  allocation  progressively  converges  to  an  Equal-per-Capita  allocation  scheme, 
which  becomes  the  allocation  rule  from  2050  onwards.  In  the  Equal-per-Capita  rule  permits  are 
distributed to regions in proportion to their population. Banking and borrowing of emissions allowances 
are not allowed, but there is no restriction to international trade of permits.   11 
2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2100
GWP (Trillions, 2005 USD) 44.21 87.09 149.26 221.43 301.26 358.44
World Population (billions) 6.51 8.01 9.02 9.53 9.51 8.96
Energy Intensity of Output (EJ/USD) 9.69 5.98 3.47 2.37 2.08 2.00
Carbon Intensity of Primary Energy (GtonC/EJ) 0.0183 0.0157 0.0107 0.0071 0.0056 0.0048
Concentrations of GHG (ppmv) 427 491 533 548 550 552
Investment in final good capital(%GWP) 20.24 18.11 15.87 14.53 13.54 13.09
R&D expenditure (%GWP) 2.12 2.21 2.19 2.25 2.31 2.32
Non-energy R&D (%GWP) 2.09 2.14 2.13 2.19 2.25 2.27
Energy Efficiency R&D (%GWP) 0.0265 0.0304 0.0390 0.0740 0.0382 0.0356
Energy R&D (%Total Investment in R&D) 1.25 1.38 1.78 1.80 1.65 1.54
 
Table 2. Stabilisation trends of major variables. 
Table  2  displays  the  trend  of  key  economic  variables  when  the  stabilisation  policy  is 
implemented. The Gross World Product (GWP) over the whole optimisation interval 2005-2100 
is lower than in the BaU scenario and discounted stabilisation policy costs are equivalent to 
1.5% of BaU discounted GWP (using a 3% declining discount rate).
13 
The stabilisation policy has a remarkable impact on R&D dynamics, as the comparison between 
Table 1 and Table 2 clearly shows. First, it induces much higher spending in energy efficiency 
R&D, confirming results already established by a wide literature.
14 Second, the stabilisation 
policy induces a contraction of non-energy R&D spending, which is greater than the increase in 
energy efficiency R&D and thus determines an overall contraction of R&D activity. 
Reduced spending in non-energy R&D is due to: (1) a general contraction of economic activity 
and (2) the fact that non-energy augmenting technical change is energy biased because of the 
complementarity between the energy and the non-energy sector. With energy biased technical 
change, an increase of non-energy R&D spending would increase energy use, and vice versa: by 
reducing non-energy R&D spending it is possible to reduce energy demand, an important way 
to cut emissions in a stabilisation scenario. It is therefore the stabilisation policy itself that 
                                                 
13  The  WITCH  model  uses  an  aggregate  damage  function  to  describe  the  feedback  of  temperature 
increase on GDP of each region. We thus account for the environmental benefits from the stabilisation 
policy. Costs rise because the stabilisation target imposed here is stricter than what found as optimal in a 
cost-benefit analysis with the WITCH model. 
14 See for example Bosetti et al (2009a) for an analysis with the WITCH model.   12 
induces  a  contraction  of  the  optimal  level  of  R&D  in  the  non-energy  sector,  and  not  the 
competition from higher spending in energy R&D. Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009) widely 
discussed this result and argued against the exogenous crowding-out hypothesis imposed in 
Nordhaus (2002) and Popp (2004, 2006) on the grounds that, at least in the medium/long term, 
societies are free to allocate the optimal amount of resources to knowledge creation. Recent 
empirical evidence presented in Newell and Popp (2009) confirms this intuition, showing that 
increased spending in energy R&D does not crowd out non-energy R&D. 
By  introducing  a  mutual link  between  the two  knowledge  frontiers, the stabilisation  policy 
triggers  more complicated dynamics of both energy and non-energy  R&D investments (see 
equations  5  and  6).  With  respect  to  the  model  without  intersectoral  spillovers,  the  policy-
induced positive shock to the stock of energy sector knowledge is transmitted to the non-energy 
sector. It increases the marginal return to non-energy R&D and partially offsets the contraction 
of R&D induced by the stabilisation policy. The final outcome is still a contraction of non-
energy  R&D  greater  than  the  increment  in  energy  R&D,  confirming  the  result  that  the 
stabilisation  policy  reduces  knowledge  accumulation  even  when  endogenous  spillovers  are 
modelled. 
It is now interesting to check how far the level of aggregate R&D spending in a stabilization 
policy is from the socially desirable one.
15 Figure 2 and  
Figure  3  show  the  time  path  of  R&D  investments  –  as  percentage  of  GWP  –  when  the 
stabilisation policy is implemented and domestic knowledge externalities are internalised. The 
optimal path of energy R&D investments is characterised by a declining trend over the century. 
The converse is true for the optimal time path of non-energy R&D investments: the trend is 
increasing because the labour becomes a scarce resource as population growth levels off by 
mid-century. The difference between the optimal path and the second-best scenarios is striking. 
If  we  consider energy  R&D,  the stabilisation policy  brings  R&D  investments  closer  to  the 
socially optimal level. Remarkably, the jump from the level optimal in the BaU does not close 
the  R&D  gap.  Contrary    to  what  happens  in  energy  R&D,  the  stabilisation  policy  brings 
investments  in  non-energy  R&D.  Consequently,  total  R&D  investment  moves  farther  away 
from the optimal level. 
                                                 
15 Here we define an optimal world as one in which the stabilisation policy is implemented to correct the 
environmental externality and knowledge intersectoral externalities that are  fully internalised  in each 
region.  This  should  not  be  confused  with  the  global  optimum,  because  we  do  not  internalise  other 
international externalities – e.g. on non-renewable resources use – and it is also not precisely a regional 
optimum, because the stabilisation policy is designed by a global social planner.   13 
When only the environmental externality is addressed, there is ample space for R&D policies 
that correct the knowledge externality in both sectors, jointly or separately. In Section 7 we 
study the welfare implications of addressing both externalities. In the next section we address 
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Figure 3. Investments in non-energy R&D/GWP. 
6. Addressing the knowledge externality: R&D policies 
In this section we study the implication of addressing only the knowledge externality by means 
of R&D policies that reduce the gap between the private and the social return to knowledge 
creation. R&D policies typically increase the attractiveness of knowledge creation by reducing   14 
the cost of innovation by means of subsidies or by increasing the reward to innovators with the 
imposition of constraints to knowledge circulation. In this case, we are not interested in the 
specificities of R&D policy, nor in its cost. In this section our aim is to assess the implications 
for the environmental externality of a hypothetical R&D policy that internalises all knowledge 
externalities in the energy sector first and then in both sectors. R&D policies that increase the 
rate of technical change are often proposed to solve both environmental and knowledge market 
failures. Here we provide a test of this proposition. 
We  consider  two  different  R&D  policies.  First,  only  the  externality  of  energy  R&D  is 
internalised (R&D Policy Energy). Second, externalities in both sectors are internalised (R&D 
Policy). Figure 4 and Figure 5 display the time path of the ratio of R&D when the policy is 
implemented and R&D in the BaU for the energy and non-energy sectors. We record a sharp 
increment of energy R&D spending when sectoral spillovers are internalised(i.e. when the social 
planner acknowledges the contribution of energy knowledge to the production of non-energy 
knowledge).  Disentangling  the  exact  forces  at  work  is  difficult  because  of  productivity 
feedbacks driven by the mutual link between the two innovation possibility frontiers and by the 
complementarity of the two knowledge stocks.
16 The R&D policy in the energy sector leads to 
higher  energy  R&D  spending,  which  increases  the  productivity  of  non-energy  knowledge 
creation (see the higher spending in non-energy R&D induced by the energy R&D policy in 












2005 2020 2035 2050 2065 2080 2095
R&D Policy Energy R&D Policy
 
Figure 4. Ratio between investments in Energy R&D under different policy schemes and energy 
                                                 
16  In  this  respect,  to  test  the  existence  of  complementarity  across  the  two  sectors  we  performed  an 
exercise in which we measure the impact of a forced expansion of energy R&D investments on non-
energy R&D investments in the absence of spillovers. Energy R&D investments are required to be, in 
each region, exactly equal to the optimal path determined when spillovers are fully internalised. We find 
that non-energy R&D investments, respond positively to an increase of energy R&D, revealing a degree 
of complementarity between the two knowledge stocks.   15 
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Figure 5. Ratio between investments in non-energy R&D under different policy schemes and non-
energy R&D investments in BaU. 
Both policies induce higher spending in R&D and an increment of both knowledge stocks with 
respect to the BaU. The increment of knowledge (i.e. of productivity) in the two sectors has 
opposite effects on energy demand: if from one side higher productivity of the energy input 
determines a lower demand of energy, from the other side the increased productivity of the non-
energy input pushes for a higher demand of the complementary energy input. The final outcome 
on  energy  demand  is  driven  by  the  relative  strength  of  these  effects,  which  is  ultimately 
determined by the relative scarcity of the energy and non-energy inputs. In our BaU scenario, in 
the long run, technical change is directed towards energy-biased knowledge because energy is 
relatively more abundant than the capital-labour input. In both R&D Policy scenarios this effect 
is enhanced and technical progress in the long run becomes more and more energy-biased; thus, 
the demand of energy increases. The carbon intensity of energy remains largely unaffected 
because regions behave non-cooperatively on the global commons and do not internalise the 
environmental externality. Therefore, the R&D policies address the knowledge market failure 
without controlling for the environmental one. The implications of the two scenarios on CO2 
emissions are depicted in Figure 6. 
Overall, R&D policies (including the one that internalises energy R&D externality) increase 
voracity, i.e. the attitude of countries in a non-cooperative setting to grab as much as possible of 
a common good, to preserve rate of return equalisation, thus exacerbating climate damage.   16 















Figure 6. World cumulative CO2 emissions (2005-2100). 
7. Addressing both environmental and knowledge 
externalities: policy costs and welfare comparison  
The previous sections have shown that addressing only the knowledge externalities increases 
the environmental problem and addressing only the environmental externality is, at best, not 
sufficient to bring R&D investments to the socially desirable level. In fact, the environmental 
policy exacerbates the knowledge externality in the non-energy sector. Therefore, at least in our 
modelling context, policies that address both externalities appear to be socially desirable. 
A first approach to evaluate the attractiveness of different policy mixes is to check their impact 
on GWP. This is the most preferred method in climate policy analysis because it allows the 
aggregation of benefits and costs without the need of a social welfare function.
17 Figure 7 shows 
that  the  energy  R&D  policy  has  a  remarkable  impact  on  stabilisation  costs:  combining  an 
energy R&D policy to the stabilisation policy would reduce costs to 0.14% of GDP for OECD 
countries  and  would  also  cut  them  considerably  in  non-OECD  ones.  At  global  level, 
stabilisation costs would be reduced to roughly one fourth of what they would be without the 
energy R&D policy. As expected, the energy R&D policy has a greater impact on costs in 
OCED countries, were the bulk of the knowledge externality is found. Figure 7 also shows that 
internalising all knowledge externalities reduces stabilisation costs further, even if by a lesser 
extent than the energy R&D policy. Stabilisation costs virtually disappear for OCED countries. 
For non-OECD countries the reduction of costs is less pronounced, as expected, and at global 
                                                 
17 Stabilisation costs are measured as the discounted sum of year–by-year GWP differences between the 
policy scenarios and the BaU scenario. It is expressed as a percentage of the BaU scenario GWP. As 
mentioned before, we abstract here from the complex assessment of the costs of the R&D policy.   17 
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Figure 7. Discounted Stabilisation policy cost. 
The fact that complementing the Stabilisation policy with an R&D policy brings a reduction of 
stabilisation costs is in line with the findings of Goulder and Schneider (1997) and Popp (2006). 
However,  there  are  some  important  differences  between  the  three  models  and  the  policies 
examined. Goulder and Schneider (1997) focus on intrasectoral spillovers and find that an R&D 
policy  reduces  stabilisation  costs  only  if  it  addresses  R&D  externalities  in  all  sectors.  If 
restricted only to sectors with low emissions, the R&D policy increases stabilisation costs. Popp 
(2006) shows that higher spending in energy R&D reduces only marginally stabilisation costs 
because it crowds out non-energy R&D investments. The crowding-out is exogenous because  
Popp does not model the explicit knowledge accumulation in the non-energy sector. Contrary to 
Popp (2006) we do not impose exogenous crowding-out assumptions because we model both 
knowledge stocks. We find that a stabilisation policy together with an R&D policy targeted at 
the only energy sector is significantly less costly than the stabilisation policy alone. We find that 
energy R&D does not crowd-out non-energy R&D and, thanks to intersectoral spillovers, the 
policy  induced  increase  in  energy  efficiency  R&D  spills  over  to  the  non-energy  sector, 
contributing to knowledge accumulation and the reduction of knowledge externalities. 
A  more  appropriate  method  to  compare  alternative  policies  is  to  rank  them  using  regional 
welfare – i.e. the discounted sum of log utility of consumption per capita.
18 Table displays the 
                                                 
18 A global analysis would require a global welfare function which is subject to complex evaluations of 
weighting schemes of regional welfares. The discount rate used is the pure rate of time preference. The 
regions  of  the  WITCH  model  are:  CAJANZ  (Canada,  Japan,  New  Zealand);  USA;  LACA  (Latin 
America, Mexico and Caribbean); WEURO (Western Europe); EEURO (Estern Europe); MENA (Middle   18 
relative regional preference ordering among the Stabilisation scenario, the Stabilisation R&D 
Policy Energy, in which only the energy sector externality is internalised, and the Stabilisation 
R&D Policy scenario, in which all knowledge externalities are internalised. Preferences are 
ranked in decreasing order and the policy mix with the highest welfare is ranked number one. 
USA WEURO EEURO KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LACA
Stabilization 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Stabilization R&D Policy Energy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1
Stabilization R&D Policy  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
OECD non-OECD
 
Table 3. Welfare ranking of different policy mixes. 
 
Addressing knowledge externalities is welfare enhancing for all regions, and for most of them 
an R&D policy that targets externalities only for energy R&D is preferred to an R&D policy 
that internalises all knowledge externalities. This result is important because it shows that it is 
rational to pay special attention to energy R&D policies in a Stabilisation scenario. The idea that 
once the environmental externalities are corrected, all kinds of R&D should be treated the same 
is compelling, but it is valid only in a simplified setting, as in Nordhaus (2009). In our model we 
find a different result for two main reasons. First, an R&D policy, which targets also the non-
energy sector increases the productivity of non-energy inputs and causes a higher demand of 
energy – because technical change is energy biased. Second, the equilibrium of the WITCH 
model is the result of an open-loop Nash game in  which countries do not coordinate their 
actions  to  achieve  an  optimum  at  planetary  scale.  Therefore,  regions  do  not  coordinate 
themselves when they implement the R&D policy and look only at the national optimal level of 
R&D spending. As a result, they increase the demand of energy beyond the globally optimal 
level and the price of emissions permits rises: in our Stabilisation R&D Policy scenario the 
carbon price is roughly 1% higher over the whole century than in the Stabilisation R&D Policy 
Energy scenario. Countries with relatively higher carbon intensity suffer higher stabilisation 
costs and see their welfare reduced, while Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SASIA) and 
East Asia (EASIA), all net sellers of emissions allowances, gain from both a higher productivity 
of the economy and a higher carbon price. This explains the results shown in Table. 
                                                                                                                                               
East  and  North  Africa);  SSA  (Sub-Saharan  Africa  excl.  South  Africa);  TE  (Transition  Economies); 
SASIA (South Asia); CHINA (including Taiwan); EASIA (South East Asia); KOSAU (Korea, South 
Africa, Australia).   19 
A final insight that we can draw from this enhanced version of the WITCH model with directed 
technical change, is how estimates of stabilisation costs change if the constraints on emissions is 
imposed on an economy in which investments in R&D are equal to the socially optimal level. 
We find that the cost of the stabilisation policy is higher if the starting point is an economy in 
which all  knowledge  externalities  are internalised.  In  particular,  not  only  stabilisation  costs 
increase in absolute value, as it is reasonable to expect in economies that are more efficient and 
thus have higher output, but they are also higher in percentage terms as Figure 8 shows. The 
reason is the non-linearity of marginal abatement costs: an economy that has no constraints on 
emissions but starts with higher R&D investments and thus higher output, will have higher 
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Figure 8 Discounted Stabilisation Policy Cost in second-best or optimal world. 
8. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section we present results of a sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of new knowledge 
creation with respect to intersectoral spillovers, to check the robustness of the main findings of 
our work. The value of the elasticity has been varied in a reasonable range around the central 
value 0.135 . 
The  first  result  to  test  is  the  impact  of  the  stabilisation  policy  on  non-energy  knowledge 
accumulation.  We  find  that  the  ratio  of  non-energy  R&D  investment  in  the  Stabilisation 
scenario to non-energy R&D investment in the BaU scenario is only minimally affected by 
different assumptions on the elasticity of substitution (see Figure 9, where the central case is 
depicted by a solid line). 
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  non-energy R&D in the BaU.  and energy R&D investments in BaU 
 
The second result that we test is the sharp increment of energy R&D investments when the 
R&D policy is implemented. We can confirm that the R&D policy substantially increases the 
optimal  amount  of  energy  R&D  investments  under  a  sufficiently  large  range  of  elasticity 
parameters, as shown in Figure 10. The increment of spending in energy R&D caused by the 
R&D policy remains remarkable, even for values of the elasticity of substitution that are at the 
lower bound of empirical estimates. 
We then consider the effect of implementing both climate and knowledge policies. As shown in 
Figure  11  and  in  Figure  12  the  higher  the  value  of  elasticity,  the  greater  the  impact  is  of 
internalising knowledge externalities on both total R&D and on the costs of stabilisation. We 
even find that for value of the elasticity greater than 0.135, GWP increases with respect to the 
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  Figure 11 Ratio of R&D investments  Figure 12 Discounted stabilisation policy costs, 
  with stabilisation and R&D policy to  with and without R&D policy. 
  R&D investments with stabilisation. 
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Finally we test the impact on emissions by internalising only knowledge externalities. As shown 
in Figure 13 we find a positive correlation between emissions and the value of elasticity. We 
also find that for all values of elasticities included in our analysis, implementing only one policy 
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Figure 13. Ratio of CO2 emissions in BaU with R&D policy to CO2 emissions in BaU. 
9. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature by expanding our understanding of the optimal mix of 
climate policies. In particular, the aim of this paper is to answer three policy questions that are 
relevant  for  the  design  of  climate  policy.  First,  what  is  the  optimal  response,  in  terms  of 
investments in R&D of a policy to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of GHGs in a second-
best framework? Second, what would be the optimal amount of R&D spending in the energy 
and non-energy sectors and what would be the environmental consequences of addressing only 
the  knowledge  externality?  Third,  what  are  the  welfare  implications  of  a  policy  mix  that 
combines a stabilisation policy with R&D policies to support the optimal level of innovation? 
We answer the above questions using an enhanced version of the WITCH model with directed 
technical  change  in  which  we  have  explicitly  modelled  intersectoral  spillovers.  R&D 
investments can be used to increase the productivity of the energy input and of non-energy 
inputs. Knowledge spills from one sector to the other, contributing to the generation of new 
ideas in a sector in which it was not originally accumulated. 
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sector and it even worsens market failures in the non-energy sector. This result confirms what 
was already found by Carraro, Massetti and Nicita (2009) in a model without intersectoral 
spillovers.  Correcting  the  environmental  externality  alone  has  contrasting  effects  on  the 
knowledge externality. Given the relative size of the two sectors, the stabilisation policy induces 
a lower amount of R&D spending than in the BaU. The answer to the first question is  that the 
stabilisation policy brings us farther from the optimal level of R&D spending. The stabilisation 
policy thus increases the need for policies to correct for the knowledge externality instead of 
reducing it. 
When only the knowledge externalities are corrected, we find that voracity – i.e. the attitude of 
countries to grab as much as possible of a common resource in a non-cooperative setting – 
exacerbates the environmental externality. Higher productivity, without a specific control for 
environmental externalities, is automatically translated into higher energy demand. Without any 
incentive to decarbonise energy, this results in higher carbon emissions and increased global 
warming.  Interestingly,  this  happens  also  when  we  correct  externalities  only  in  the  energy 
sector, enhancing the overall energy efficiency of the economies. 
It seems that correcting both externalities is welfare enhancing with respect to enacting the 
single policies alone. The question is, however, what is the optimal mix of these policies? If we 
use GDP to compare the policy mixes, we find lower stabilisation costs if we complement the 
environmental  policy  with  an  R&D  policy  that  internalise  both  knowledge  externalities.  If 
instead, we compare the policy scenarios using discounted utility, which is a more appropriate 
indicator of welfare than GDP, we obtain an important result: the preferred policy mix (in most 
regions)  combines  the  Stabilisation  policy  with  a  policy  to  correct  knowledge  market 
externalities in the energy R&D sector alone. We thus find evidence to support the idea to 
combine a stabilisation policy with a policy to support energy R&D only.  
So far, the debate on the optimal policy mix has been intense but vague. With this paper we 
have introduced a more sophisticated approach to describe knowledge dynamics by providing 
insights to the modelling community. We have also produced a first set of results that give 
substance to policy discussions.   23 
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Appendix. Model Equations and List of Variables. 
In this Appendix we reproduce the main equations of the model. For a full description of the model please 
refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007). The list of variables is reported at the end. In each region, 
indexed by n, a social planner maximises the following utility function: 
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Economic module 
The budget constraint defines consumption as net output less investments: 
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Where j denotes energy technologies. 
Output  is  produced  via  a  nested  CES  function  that  combines  a  capital-labour  aggregate  and  energy; 
capital and labour are obtained from a CES function. The climate damage  W  reduces gross output; to 
obtain net output we subtract the costs of the fuels f and of CCS: 
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Total factor productivity  ( ) t n TFP ,  evolves exogenously with time.  
Energy services are an aggregate of energy and a stock of knowledge combined with a CES function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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Energy is a combination of electric and non-electric energy: 
( ) [ ]
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Each factor is further decomposed into several sub-components. Figure 2 portrays a graphical illustration 
of the energy sector. Factors are aggregated using CES, linear and Leontief production functions. 
Capital-labour services are obtained aggregating a capital-labour input and a knowledge stock with a CES 
function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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The capital-labour input is a CES combination of capital and labour. Labour is assumed to be equal to 
population and evolves exogenously. 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
KL KL KL t n L n t n K n t n KL L C K
r r r a a
/ 1
) , ( ) , ( , + =   (A8) 
Final good capital accumulates following the standard perpetual rule:   26 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) t n I t n  K   t n K C C C C , 1 , 1 , + - = + d .  (A9) 
New  ideas  which  contribute  to  the  stock  of  energy  knowledge,  ( ) t n ZHE , ,  are  produced  using  R&D 
investments,  ( ) t n I EN D R , , & , together with the previously cumulated knowledge stock  ( ) t n HE , : 
( ) × =
d c b
HE HE t n HKL t n HE t n I  a   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ,   (A10) 
Similarly, new ideas in the non-energy sector are generated as follows: 
( )
i h g
HKL HKL t n HE t n HKL t n I  f   t n Z ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , =    (A11) 
The two knowledge stocks evolve as follows: 
( ) t n Z t n  HE )  t HE(n HE , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + - = + d   (A12) 
( ) t n Z t n  HKL )  t HKL(n HKL , ) 1 )( , ( 1 , + - = + d   (A13) 
For illustrative purposes, we show how electricity is produced via capital, operation and maintenance and 
resource use through a zero-elasticity Leontief aggregate: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } t n X t n O&M t n K t n EL EL j j j j n j j n j , ; , ; , min , , , , V t m = .  (A14) 
Capital for electricity generation technologies accumulates as follows: 
( ) ( )
) , (
) , (
1 ) , ( 1 ,
t n SC
t n I
t n K t n K
j
j
j j j + - = + d ,  (A15) 
where,  for  selected  technologies,  the  new  capital  investment  cost  SC(n,t)  decreases  with  the  world 
cumulated installed capacity by means of Learning-by-Doing: 
( ) ( )
j PR
t n j j j t n K n B t n SC
2 log
, ) ( ,
- ∑∑ = .  (A16) 
Operation and maintenance is treated as an investment that fully depreciates every year. The resources 
employed in electricity production are subtracted from output in equation A3 and A4. Their prices are 
calculated endogenously  using a reduced-form cost  function that allows  for non-linearity in both the 
depletion effect and in the rate of extraction: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) n
f f f f f
f t n Q t n Q n n t n P
y p c , 1 , ) ( , - + =   (A17) 
where  f Q  is cumulative extraction of fuel f : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
-
= + = -
1
0 , , 0 , 1 ,
t
s extr f f f s n X n Q t n Q .  (A18) 
Each  country  covers  consumption  of  fuel  f  ,  ( ) t n X f , ,  by  either  domestic  extraction  or  imports, 
( ) t n X netimp f , , , or by a combination of both. If the country is a net exporter,  ( ) t n X netimp f , ,  is negative. 
( ) ( ) ( ) t n X t n X t n X netimp f extr f f , , , , , + =   (A19) 
Climate Module 
GHGs emissions from combustion of fossil fuels are derived by applying stoichiometric coefficients to 
the total amount of fossil fuels utilised minus the amount of CO2 sequestered: 
( ) ( ) ( ) t n CCS t n X t n CO
f f CO f , , ,
2 , 2 - =∑ w .  (A20) 
When a cap on emission (CAP) is included we have an additional equation, constraining emissions, given 
the possibility to sell and buy permits: 
( ) ) , ( ) , ( , 2 t n NIP t n CAP t n CO + =   (A21) 
In addition, carbon permits revenues/expenses enter the budget constraint: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t n NIP t p t n O&M t n I t n I
t n I t n I t n I t n Y t n C
j j j j j j D R
KL D R EN D R C
, , , ,
, , , , ,
, &
, & , &
- - - -
- - - =
∑ ∑ ∑
  (A3’) 
The damage function impacting output varies with global temperature:   27 
( )
2
, 2 , 1 ) ( ) ( 1
1
) , (
t T t T
t n
n n q q + +
= W .  (A22) 
Temperature increases through augmented radiating forcing F(t): 
[ ] { } ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 2 1 t T t T t T t F t T t T LO - - - + + = + s l s   (A23) 
which in turn depends on CO2 concentrations: 
[ ] { } ) ( ) 2 log( / ) ( log ) ( t O M t M t F
PI
AT AT + - =h ,  (A24) 
caused by emissions from fuel combustion and land use change: 
( ) [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) 1 ( 21 11 2 t M t M t LU t n CO t M UP AT
n
j AT f f + + + = + ∑ ,  (A25) 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 32 12 22 t M t M t M t M LO AT UP UP f f f + + = + ,  (A26) 
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 23 33 t M t M t M UP LO LO f f + = + .  (A27) 
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